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Abstract. The correctness of networks is often described in terms of
the individual data flow of components instead of their global behavior.
In software-defined networks, it is far more convenient to specify the cor-
rect behavior of packets than the global behavior of the entire network.
Petri nets with transits extend Petri nets and Flow-LTL extends LTL
such that the data flows of tokens can be tracked. We present the tool
AdamMC as the first model checker for Petri nets with transits against
Flow-LTL. We describe how AdamMC can automatically encode con-
current updates of software-defined networks as Petri nets with transits
and how common network specifications can be expressed in Flow-LTL.
Underlying AdamMC is a reduction to a circuit model checking prob-
lem. We introduce a new reduction method that results in tremendous
performance improvements compared to a previous prototype. Thereby,
AdamMC can handle software-defined networks with up to 82 switches.
1 Introduction
In networks, it is difficult to specify correctness in terms of the global behavior
of the entire system. Instead, the individual flow of components is far more
convenient to specify correct behavior. For example, loop and drop freedom can
be easily specified for the flow of each packet. Petri nets and LTL lack this local
view. Petri nets with transits and Flow-LTL have been introduced to overcome
this restriction [10]. A transit relation is introduced to follow the flow induced
by tokens. Flow-LTL is a temporal logic to specify both the local flow of data
and the global behavior of markings. The global behavior as in Petri nets and
LTL is still important for maximality and fairness assumptions. In this paper,
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Fig. 1: Access control at an airport modeled as Petri net with transits. Colored
arrows display the transit relation and define flow chains to model the passengers.
we present the tool AdamMC3 as the first model checker for Petri nets with
transits against Flow-LTL and its application to software-defined networking.
In Fig. 1, we present an example of a Petri net with transits that models the
security check at an airport where passengers are checked by a security guard.
The number of passengers entering the airport is unknown in advance. Rather
than introducing the complexity of an infinite number of tokens, we use a fixed
number of tokens to model possibly infinitely many flow chains. This is done by
the transit relation which is depicted with colored arrows.
The left-hand side of Fig. 1 models passengers who want to reach the ter-
minal. There are three tokens in the places airport, queue, and terminal. Thus,
transitions start and en are always enabled. Each firing of start creates a new
flow chain as depicted by the green arrow. This models a new person arriving at
the airport. Meanwhile, the double-headed blue arrow maintains all flow chains
that are still in place airport. Passengers have to enter the queue and wait until
the security check is performed. Therefore, transition en continues every flow
chain in airport to queue. Checking the passengers is carried out by transition
check which becomes enabled if the security guard works. Thus, passengers re-
siding in queue have to wait until the guard checks them. Afterwards, they reach
the terminal. The security guard is modeled on the right-hand side of Fig. 1. By
firing comeToWork and thus moving the token in place home, her flow chain
starts and she can repeatedly either idle or work, check passengers, and return.
Her transit relation is depicted in orange and models exactly one flow chain.
In Fig. 1, we define the checkpoints cp1 and cp2 and the booth as a security
zone and require that passengers never enter the security zone and eventually
reach the terminal. The flow formula ϕ = A(airport→ ( ¬(cp1∨ cp2∨ booth)∧
terminal)) specifies this. AdamMC verifies the example from Fig. 1 against
the formula check → ϕ specifying that if passengers are checked regularly
then they cannot access the security zone and eventually reach the terminal.
In this paper, we present AdamMC as a full-fledged tool. First, AdamMC
can handle Petri nets with transits and Flow-LTL formulas in general. Second,
AdamMC has an input interface for a concurrent update and a software-defined
network and encodes both of them as a Petri nets with transits. Common as-
3AdamMC is available online: https://uol.de/en/csd/adammc [12].
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sumptions on fairness and requirements for network correctness are also pro-
vided as Flow-LTL formulas. This allows users of the tool to model check the
correctness of concurrent updates and to prevent packet loss, routing loops, and
network congestion. Third, AdamMC provides algorithms to check safe Petri
nets against LTL with both places and transitions as atomic propositions which
makes it especially easy to specify fairness and maximality assumptions.
The tool reduces the model checking problem for safe Petri nets with transits
against Flow-LTL to the model checking problem for safe Petri nets against LTL.
We develop the new parallel approach to check global and local behavior in paral-
lel instead of in a sequential manner. This reduction method yields a tremendous
speed-up for a small number of local requirements and realistic fairness assump-
tions in comparison to the sequential approach of a previous prototype [10]. This
is surprising as the parallel approach has inferior worst-case complexity com-
pared to the sequential approach but practical examples from software-defined
networking avoid the corresponding blow-up in the reduction.
As last step, AdamMC reduces the model checking problem of safe Petri nets
against LTL to a circuit model checking problem. This is solved by ABC [2,4]
with effective verification techniques like IC3 and bounded model checking.
AdamMC verifies concurrent updates of software-defined networks with up to
38 switches (31 more than the prototype) and falsifies concurrent updates of
software-defined networks with up to 82 switches (44 more than the prototype).
The paper is structured as follows: In Sec. 2, we recall Petri nets with transits
and Flow-LTL. In Sec. 3, we outline the three application areas of AdamMC:
checking safe Petri nets with transits against Flow-LTL, checking concurrent
updates of software-defined networks against common assumptions and specifi-
cations, and checking safe Petri nets against LTL. In Sec. 4, we algorithmically
encode concurrent updates of software-defined networks in Petri nets with tran-
sits. In Sec. 5, we introduce the parallel approach for the underlying circuit
model checking problem. In Sec. 6, we present our experimental evaluation.
2 Petri Nets With Transits and Flow-LTL
A safe Petri net with transits N = (P,T,F, In, Υ ) [10] contains the set of
places P, the set of transitions T, the flow relation F ⊆ (P×T)∪(T×P), and
the initial marking In ⊆ P as in safe Petri nets [27]. In a safe Petri net, reachable
markings contain at most one token per place. The transit relation Υ is for every
transition t ∈ T of type Υ (t) ⊆ (preN(t) ∪ {B}) × postN(t). With p Υ (t) q, we
define that firing transition t transits the flow in place p to place q. The symbol B
denotes a start and B Υ (t) q defines that firing transition t starts a new flow
for the token in place q. Note that the transit relation can split, merge, and
end flows. A sequence of flows leads to a flow chain which is a sequence of the
current place and the fired outgoing transition. Thus, Petri nets with transits
can describe both the global progress of tokens and the local flow of data.
Flow-LTL [10] extends linear temporal logic and uses places and transitions
as atomic propositions. It also introduces A as a new operator which uses LTL
4 B. Finkbeiner et al.
Common
Network
Properties
Topology
Init. Conf.
Update
Petri Net
with
Transits
Flow-LTL
Formula
∨ LTL
Formula
Safe
Petri Net
Circuit
(System)
Circuit
3
7
(CEX)
MCHyper ABC
Input I Input II Input III
Fig. 2: Overview of the workflow of AdamMC: The application areas of the tool
are given by three different input domains: software-defined network / Flow-LTL
(Input I), Petri nets with transits / Flow-LTL (Input II), and Petri nets / LTL
(Input III). AdamMC performs all unlabeled steps. MCHyper creates the final
circuit which ABC checks to answer the initial model checking problem.
to specify the flow of data for all flow chains. For Fig. 1, the formula A(booth →
check) specifies that the guard performs at least one check. We call formulas
starting with A flow formulas. Formulas surrounding flow formulas specify the
global progress of tokens in the form of markings and fired transitions to formal-
ize maximality and fairness assumptions. These formulas are called run formulas.
Often, Flow-LTL formulas have the form run formula → flow formula.
3 Application Areas
AdamMC consists of modules for three application areas: checking safe Petri
nets with transits against Flow-LTL, checking concurrent updates of software-
defined networks against common assumptions and specifications, and checking
safe Petri nets against LTL. The general architecture and workflow of the model
checking procedure is given in Fig. 2. AdamMC is based on the tool Adam [15].
Petri Nets with Transits Petri nets with transits follow the progress of to-
kens and the flow of data. Flow-LTL allows to specify requirements on both. For
Petri nets with transits and Flow-LTL (Input II), AdamMC extends a parser
for Petri nets provided by APT [30], provides a parser for Flow-LTL, and im-
plements two reduction methods to create a safe Petri net and an LTL formula.
The sequential approach is outlined in [10] and the parallel approach in Sec. 5.
Software-Defined Networks Concurrent updates of software-defined net-
works are the second application area of AdamMC. The tool automatically
encodes an initially configured network topology and a concurrent update as a
Petri net with transit. The concurrent update renews the forwarding table. We
provide parsers for the network topology, the initial configuration, the concurrent
update, and Flow-LTL (Input I). In Sec. 4, we present the creation of a Petri
net with transits from the input and Flow-LTL formulas for common network
properties like connectivity, loop freedom, drop freedom, and packet coherence.
Petri Nets AdamMC supports the model checking of safe Petri nets against
LTL with both places and transitions as atomic propositions. It provides ded-
icated algorithms to check interleaving-maximal runs of the system. A run is
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called interleaving-maximal if a transition is fired whenever a transition is en-
abled. Furthermore, AdamMC allows a concurrent view on runs and can check
concurrency-maximal runs which demand that each subprocess of the system,
rather than only the entire system, has to progress maximally. State-of-the-art
tools like LoLA [32] and ITS-Tools [29] are restricted to interleaving-maximal
runs and only allow for places as atomic propositions. For the standard Petri
net model checking (Input III), we provide a parser for LTL formulas and allow
Petri nets in APT and PNML format as input.
The construction of the circuit in Aiger format [3] is defined in [11]. MCHy-
per [16] is used to create a circuit from a given circuit and an LTL formula.
This circuit is given to ABC [2,4] which provides a toolbox of modern hardware
verification algorithms like IC3 and bounded model checking to decide the initial
model checking question. As output for all three modules, AdamMC transforms
a possible counterexample (CEX) from ABC into a counterexample of the Petri
net (with transits) and visualizes the net with Graphviz and the dot language [9].
When no counterexample exists, AdamMC verified the input successfully.
4 Verifying Updates of Software Defined Networks
We show how AdamMC can check concurrent updates of realistic examples from
software-defined networking (SDN) against typical specifications [19]. SDN [25,6]
separates the data plane for forwarding packets and the control plane for the
routing configuration. A central controller initiates updates which can cause
problems like routing loops or packet loss. AdamMC provides an input interface
to automatically encode software-defined networks and concurrent updates of
their configuration as Petri nets with transits. The tool checks requirements like
loop and drop freedom to find erroneous updates before they are deployed.
4.1 Network Topology, Configurations, and Updates
A network topology T is an undirected graph T = (Sw ,Con) with switches as
vertices and connections between switches as edges. Packets enter the network
at ingress switches and they leave at egress switches. Forwarding rules are of the
form x.fwd(y) with x, y ∈ Sw . A concurrent update has the following syntax:
switch update ::= upd(x.fwd(y/z)) | upd(x.fwd(y/-)) | upd(x.fwd(-/z))
sequential update ::= (update >> update >> ... >> update)
parallel update ::= (update || update || ... || update)
update ::= switch update | sequential update |parallel update
where a switch update can renew the forwarding rule of switch x from switch z
to switch y, introduce a new forwarding rule from switch x to switch y, or remove
an existing forwarding rule from switch x to switch z.
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4.2 Data Plane and Control Plane as Petri Net with Transits
For a network topology T = (Sw ,Con), a set of ingress switches, a set of egress
switches, an initial forwarding table, and a concurrent update, we show how data
and control plane are encoded as Petri net with transits. Switches are modeled
by tokens remaining in corresponding places s whereas the flow of packets is
modeled by the transit relation Υ . Specific transitions is model ingress switches
where new data flows begin. Tokens in places of the form x.fwd(y) configure the
forwarding. Data flows are extended by firing transitions (x,y) corresponding
to configured forwarding without moving any tokens. Thus, we model any order
of newly generated packets and their forwarding. Assuming that each existing
direction of a connection between two switches is explicitly given in Con, we
obtain Algorithm 1 which calls Algorithm 2 to obtain the control plane.
input : T = (Sw ,Con), ingress,
forwarding, update
output: Petri net with transits
N = (P,T,F, In, Υ ) for
update of topology T with
ingress and forwarding
create emptyN = (P,T,F, In, Υ );
for switch s ∈ Sw do
add place s to P;
add place s to In;
if s ∈ ingress then
add transition is to T;
add s to pre (is), post (is);
add creating data flow
B Υ (is) s to Υ ;
add maintaining data flow
s Υ (is) s to Υ ;
for connection (x, y) ∈ Con do
add place x.fwd(y) to P;
if x.fwd(y) ∈ forwarding then
add place x.fwd(y) to In;
add transition (x, y) to T;
add x, y, x.fwd(y) to pre ((x, y)),
post ((x, y));
add connecting data flow
x Υ ((x, y)) y to Υ ;
add maintaining data flow
y Υ ((x, y)) y to Υ ;
N = call Algorithm 2 with T ,
update, N as input;
add place updates to In;
Algorithm 1: Data plane
input : T = (Sw ,Con), update, N
output: N = (P,T,F, In, Υ )
for switch update u ∈ SwU do
// u = upd(x.fwd(y/z))
add places us, uf to P;
add transition u to T;
add us to pre (u), uf to post (u);
if z 6= - then
add x.fwd(z) to pre (u);
if y 6= - then
add x.fwd(y) to post (u);
for sequential update s ∈ SeU do
// s = [s1, ..., si, ..., s|s|]
add places ss, sf to P;
for i ∈ {0, ..., |s|} do
add transition si to T;
if i == 0 then
add ss to pre (si);
else
add sfi to pre (s
i);
if i = |s| then
add sf to post (si);
else
add ssi+1 to post (s
i);
for parallel update p ∈ PaU do
add places ps, pf to P;
add transitions po, pc to T;
add ps to pre (po), pf to post (pc);
for sub-update ui of p do
add usi to post (p
o), ufi to pre (p
c);
Algorithm 2: Control plane
For the update, let SwU be the set of switch updates in it, SeU the set of
sequential updates in it, and PaU the set of parallel updates in it. Depending
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Fig. 3: Overview of the sequential approach: Each firing of a transition of the
original net is split into first firing a transition in the subnet for the run formula
and subsequently firing a transition in each subnet tracking a flow formula. The
constructed LTL formula skips the additional steps with until operators.
on update’s type, it is also added to the respective set. The subnet for the update
has an empty transit relation but moves tokens from and to places of the form
x.fwd(y). Tokens in these places correspond to the forwarding table. The order
of the switch updates is defined by the nesting of sequential and parallel updates.
The update is realized by a specific token moving through unique places of the
form us, uf , ss, sf , ps, pf for start and finish of each switch update u ∈ SwU , each
sequential update s ∈ SeU , and each parallel update p ∈ PaU . A parallel update
temporarily increases the number of tokens and reduces it upon completion to
one. Algorithm 2 defines the update behavior between start and finish places
and connects finish and start places depending on the subexpression structure.
4.3 Assumptions and Requirements
We use the run formula pre (t) → t to assume weak fairness for ev-
ery transition t in our encoding N. Transitions, which are always enabled after
some point, are ensured to fire infinitely often. Thus, packets are eventually
forwarded and the routing table is eventually updated. We use flow formulas to
test specific requirements for all packets. Connectivity (A(
∨
s∈egress s)) ensures
that all packets reach an egress switch. Packet coherence (A( (
∨
s∈initial s) ∨
(
∨
s∈final s))) tests that packets are either routed according to the initial or final
configuration. Drop freedom (A (
∧
e∈egress ¬e →
∨
f∈Con f)) forbids dropped
packets whereas loop freedom (A (
∧
s∈Sw\egress s→ (sU ¬s))) forbids rout-
ing loops. We combine run and flow formula into fairness → requirement.
5 Algorithms and Optimizations
Central to model checking a Petri net with transits N against a Flow-LTL
formula ϕ is the reduction to a safe Petri net N> and an LTL formula ϕ>. The
infinite state space of the Petri net with transits due to possibly infinitely many
flow chains is reduced to a finite state model. The key idea is to guess and track a
violating flow chain for each flow subformula Aψi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and to only
once check the equivalent future of flow chains merging into a common place.
AdamMC provides two approaches for this reduction: Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 give
an overview of the sequential approach and the parallel approach, respectively.
Both algorithms create one subnet N>i for each flow subformula Aψi to track
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Fig. 4: Overview of the parallel approach: The n subnets are connected such that
for every transition t ∈ T there are (|Υ (t)| + 1)n transitions, i.e., there is one
transition for every combination of which transit of t (or none) is tracked by
which subnet. We use until operators in the constructed LTL formula to only
skip steps not involving the tracking of the guessed chain in the flow formula.
the corresponding flow chain and have one subnet N>O to check the run part of
the formula. The places of N>O are copies of the places in N such that the cur-
rent state of the system can be memorized. The subnets N>i also consist of the
original places of N but only use one token (initially residing on an additional
place) to track the current state of the considered flow chain. The approaches
differ in how these nets are connected to obtain N>.
Sequential Approach The places in each subnetN>i are connected with one
transition for each transit (Tfl =
⋃
t∈T Υ (t)). An additional token iterates se-
quentially through the subnets to activate or deactivate the subnet. This allows
each subnet to track a flow chain corresponding to firing a transition inN>O . The
formula ϕ> takes care of these additional steps by means of the until operator:
In the run part of the formula, all steps corresponding to moves in a subnet N>i
are skipped and, for each subformula Aψi, all steps are skipped until the next
transition of the corresponding subnet is fired which transits the tracked flow
chain. This technique results in a polynomial increase of the size of the Petri
net and the formula: N> has O(|N| · n + |N|) places and O(|N|3 · n + |N|)
transitions and the size of ϕ> is in O(|N|3 · n · |ϕ| + |ϕ|). We refer to [11] for
formal details.
Parallel Approach The n subnets are connected such that the current chain
of each subnet is tracked simultaneously while firing an original transition t ∈ T.
Thus, there are (|Υ (t)|+ 1)n transitions. Each of these transitions stands for ex-
actly one combination of which subnet is tracking which (or no) transit. Hence,
firing one transition of the original net is directly tracked in one step for all sub-
nets. This significantly reduces the complexity of the run part of the constructed
formula, because no until operator is needed to skip sequential steps. A disjunc-
tion over all transitions corresponding to an original transition suffices to ensure
correctness of the construction. Transitions and next operators in the flow parts
of the formula still have to be replaced by means of the until operator to ensure
that the next step of the tracked flow chain is checked at the corresponding step
of the global timeline of ϕ>. In general, the parallel approach results in an ex-
ponential blow-up of the net and the formula: N> has O(|N| · n + |N|) places
and O(|N|3n + |N|) transitions and the size of ϕ> is in O(|N|3n · |ϕ|+ |ϕ|). For
the practical examples, however, the parallel approach allows for model checking
Flow-LTL with few flow subformulas with a tremendous speed-up in comparison
to the sequential approach. We refer to App. A for formal details.
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Table 1: Overview of optimization parameters of AdamMC: The three reduction
steps depicted in the first column can each be executed by different algorithms.
The first step allows to combine the optimizations of the first and second row.
1) Petri Net with Transits  Petri Net sequential parallel
inhibitor act. token inhibitor act. token
2) Petri Net  Circuit explicit logarithmic
3) Circuit  Circuit gate optimizations
Optimizations Various optimizations parameters can be applied to the model
checking routine described in Sec. 3 to tweak the performance. Table 1 gives an
overview of the major parameters. We found that the versions of the sequential
and the parallel approach with inhibitor arcs to track flow chains are generally
faster than the versions without. Furthermore, the reduction routine for creating
a circuit from a Petri net and an LTL formula which copes with logarithmically
encoded transitions had generally better performance than the explicit routine.
However, several possibilities to reduce the number of gates of the created cir-
cuit worsened the performance of some benchmark families and improved the
performance of others. Consequently, all parameters are selectable by the user
and a script is provided to compare different settings. For a complete view of the
selectable optimization parameters, we refer to the documentation of AdamMC
which is, as well as the tool itself, available online [12,14]. Our main improvement
claims can be retraced by the case study in Sec. 6.
6 Evaluation
We conduct a case study based on SDN. The performance improvements of
AdamMC compared to the prototype [10] are summarized in Table 2. For real-
istic software-defined networks [19], one ingress and one egress switch are chosen
at random. Two forwarding tables between the two switches and an update from
the first to the second configuration are chosen at random. AdamMC verifies
that the update maintained connectivity between ingress and egress switch. The
results are depicted in rows starting with T in Table 2. For rows starting with F,
we required connectivity of a random switch which is neither in the forwarding
tables nor in the update. AdamMC falsified this requirement for the update.
The prototype implementation (column two) based on an explicit encoding
can verify updates of networks with 7 switches and falsify updates of networks
with 38 switches. We optimize the explicit encoding to a logarithmic encoding
and the number of switches for which updates can be verified increases to 17 and
most of the time the runtime is lower. More significantly, the parallel approach
in combination with the logarithmic encoding leads to tremendous performance
gains. The performance gains of an approach with an inferior worst-case com-
plexity are mainly due to the smaller complexity of the LTL formula ϕ created
by the reduction. The encoding of software defined networks requires fairness
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Table 2: We compare the explicit and logarithmic encoding of the sequential
approach with the parallel approach. The results are the average over five runs
from an Intel i7-2700K CPU with 3.50 GHz, 32 GB RAM, and a timeout (TO)
of 30 minutes. The runtimes are given in seconds.
expl. enc. log. enc. parallel appr.
T / F Network #Sw Alg. Time |= Alg. Time |= Alg. Time |=
T Arpanet196912 4 IC3 12.08 3 IC3 9.89 3 IC3 2.18 3
T Napnet 6 IC3 146.49 3 IC3 96.06 3 IC3 4.75 3
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
T Heanet 7 IC3 806.81 3 IC3 84.62 3 IC3 30.30 3
T HiberniaIreland 7 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 26.58 3
T Arpanet19706 9 - TO ? IC3 362.21 3 IC3 11.33 3
T Nordu2005 9 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 12.67 3
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
T Fatman 17 - TO ? IC3 1543.34 3 IC3 162.17 3
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
T Myren 37 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1309.23 3
T KentmanJan2011 38 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1261.32 3
F Arpanet196912 4 BMC3 2.18 7 BMC3 1.85 7 BMC3 1.97 7
F Napnet 6 BMC2 4.17 7 BMC2 5.22 7 BMC3 1.48 7
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
F Fatman 17 BMC3 168.78 7 BMC3 169.82 7 BMC3 6.72 7
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
F Belnet2009 21 BMC2 1146.26 7 BMC2 611.81 7 BMC3 24.26 7
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
F KentmanJan2011 38 BMC3 167.92 7 BMC3 86.44 7 BMC2 9.35 7
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
F Latnet 69 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 209.20 7
F Ulaknet 82 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1043.74 7
Sum of runtimes (in hours): 82.99 79.15 30.31
Nb of TOs (of 230 exper.): 146 138 6
assumptions for each transition. These assumptions (encoded in the run part
of the formula) experience a blow-up with until operators by the sequential ap-
proach but only need a disjunction in the parallel approach. Hence, the size of
networks for which AdamMC can verify updates increases to 38 switches and
the size for which it can falsify updates increases to 82 switches. For rather small
networks, the tool needs only a few seconds to verify and falsify updates which
makes it a great option for operators when updating networks.
7 Related Work
We refer to [21] for an introduction to SDN. Solutions for correctness of updates
of software-defined networks include consistent updates [28,7], dynamic schedul-
ing [17], and incremental updates [18]. Both explicit and SMT-based model
checking [5,23,22,31,1,26] is used to verify software-defined networks. Closest to
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our approach are models of networks as Kripke structures to use model checking
for synthesis of correct network updates [8,24]. The model checking subroutine
of the synthesizer assumes that each packet sees at most one updated switch.
Our model checking routine does not make such an assumption.
There is a significant number of model checking tools (e.g., [32,29]) for Petri
nets and an annual model checking contest [20]. On the one hand, AdamMC is
restricted to safe Petri nets whereas other tools can handle bounded and colored
Petri nets. On the other hand, AdamMC accepts LTL formulas with places and
transitions as atomic propositions. This is essential to assume fairness in our
encoding of software-defined networks.
8 Conclusion
We presented the tool AdamMC with its three application domains: checking
safe Petri nets with transits against Flow-LTL, checking concurrent updates of
software-defined networks against common assumptions and specifications, and
checking safe Petri nets against LTL. New algorithms and optimizations allow
AdamMC to model check software-defined networks of realistic size: it can verify
updates of networks with up to 38 switches and can falsify updates of networks
with up to 82 switches.
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Appendix
A Technical Details
In this part of the appendix, details of the parallel approach, i.e., the construction
of the Petri net N> and the construction of the LTL formula ϕ>, are given.
A.1 Construction of the Net Transformation (Parallel Approach)
Let ID be a set of unique identifiers and νN : P ∪T → ID an injective naming
function which uniquely identifies every place and transition of a given Petri
net N (or of a Petri net with transits). We omit the subscript if the net is clear
from the context. To keep the presentation clear, we often directly use identifier
for a node n ∈ P ∪T with ν(n) = identifier .
The construction of a Petri net with transits to a standard P/T Petri net
with inhibitor arcs is given by the following definition.
Definition 1 (Petri Net with Transits to a P/T Petri Net). For a Petri
net with transitsN = (P,T,F, In, Υ ) and a Flow-LTL formula ϕ with n subfor-
mulas, a Petri net N> = (P>,T>,F>,F>I , In
>) with inhibitor arcs (denoted
by F>I ) and a labeling function λ : T
> → T are defined as follows:
(p) The places of the original net N are copied n+ 1 times:
P> = P ∪
⋃
{1,...,n}
({[ι]i} ∪ {[p]i | p ∈ P})
(t) For every transition t ∈ T and every combination of which subnet is tracking
which transit (or no transit with marker ◦), there is one transition in N>.
Each transition is connected to the original part of the net according to t. For
the subnet part, it either a) moves the token from the initial place according
to the transit, b) moves the token from the corresponding ingoing place of the
transit according to the transit, or, in the case that the subnet is not involved
in any of the transits, c) is connected by inhibitor arcs to all ingoing places
of the transition t.
∀t ∈ T : ∀c = ((x1, p1), . . . , (xn, pn)) ∈ (Υ (t) ∪ {◦})n : ∃t> ∈ T> :
∀(p, t), (t, q) ∈ F : (p, t>), (t>, q) ∈ F> ∧ ν(t>) = ν(t)c ∧ λ(t>) = ν(t)∧
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xi = B =⇒ ([ι]i , t>), (t>, [pi]i) ∈ F> ∧
xi, pi ∈ P =⇒ ([xi]i , t>), (t>, [pi]i) ∈ F> ∧
(xi, pi) = ◦ =⇒ ∀(p, t) ∈ F : ([pi]i , t>) ∈ F>I
(I) The initial marking is given by In> = In ∪ {[ι]i | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
The setsT>,F>, andF>I are defined as the smallest sets fulfilling condition (t).
The identifiers with the square brackets and those with a combination c in their
index are fresh identifiers.
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time steps
τ
β1
...
βi
...
Fig. 5: A possible sequence of the global timeline τ and the timelines of the
possible infinite number of flow chains βi. A filled timestep for a timeline of a
flow chain indicates that the fired transition has a transit which extends this
flow chain.
The results regarding the size of the constructed net directly follow from the
definition and that there are |P| · |T| · |P|+ |T| · |P| transits in the worst-case.
Lemma 1 (Size of the Constructed Net). The constructed Petri net N>
has O(|N| · n+ |N|) places and O(|N|3n + |N|) transitions.
A.2 Construction of the Formula Transformation (Parallel
Approach)
We create an LTL formula ϕ> to the Petri net N> (created by Def. 1 of a Petri
net with transitsN = (P,T,F, In, Υ )) from a Flow-LTL formula ϕ with n ∈ N
flow subformulas ϕFi = Aψi. The intricate part of the construction is to deal
with the different timelines. On the one hand, there is the global timeline of the
Petri net N. This timeline can be used to check the run part of the formula.
On the other hand, there are the different timelines of the possible infinite flow
chains. For the flow chains, the global steps not concerning the chain have to be
adequately skipped with until operators. Figure 5 gives an overview of a possible
sequence of different timelines.
We define the set of transitions tracking a chain of a specific subnet i ∈
{1, . . . , n} by T>i = {t ∈ T> | ∃p ∈ P : ([p]i , t) ∈ F> ∨ (t, [p]i) ∈ F>} and
the set of all other transitions by Oi = T
> \T>i . For a transition t ∈ T, the
set Mi(t) = T
>
i ∩ {t> ∈ T> | λ(t>) = t} collects all corresponding transitions
tracking a chain of the subnet.
First, the places of the flow subformulas have to be substituted by the cor-
responding places tracking the chain, i.e., all occurrences of a place p ∈ P in a
flow subformula ϕFi are simultaneously replaced by [p]i. Second, the transitions
of the flow subformulas have to be substituted such that all steps of the global
timeline which do not involve the tracked flow chain are skipped until a transition
involving the flow chain is fired, i.e., all occurrences of a transition t ∈ T in a flow
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subformula ϕFi are simultaneously substituted by (
∨
to∈Oi to)U (
∨
tm∈Mi(t) tm).
Similarly, the next operator of the flow subformulas have to be substituted such
that the steps of the global timeline are skipped until a step involving the track-
ing subnet is taken. Here two cases have to be considered: either the chain ends,
i.e., no transition of the subnet is ever fired again, then the formula has to di-
rectly hold in the stuttering part, or there is a transition of the subnet, then the
formula has to hold in the direct successor state. This means all occurrences of
a subformula φ in a flow subformula ϕFi are replaced from the inner- to the
outermost occurrence by ((
∨
t∈Oi t)U ((
∨
t∈T>i t)∧ φ))∨ ( (¬(
∨
t∈T>i t))∧φ).
For the run part of the formula, we can directly use the global timeline,
i.e., the next operator needs no substitution. Further, the places are already
correctly named. Only the transitions t ∈ T in the run part of ϕ have to be
substituted simultaneously by
∨
t′∈{t′∈T> | λ(t′)=t} t
′ to allow for all transitions
corresponding to t.
Finally, the flow subformulas are simultaneously substituted by [ι]iW(¬ [ι]i∧
ψ′i) (where ψ
′
i is the result of the above mentioned substitutions within a flow
subformula) such that all steps of the global timeline are skipped until a flow
chain is created and tracked. Table 3 gives an overview of these substitutions.
Table 3: An overview of the necessary substitutions to create ϕ> from ϕ. The
next operator is substituted from the innermost to the outermost occurrence,
the other subformulas are substituted simultaneously.
Run part of ϕ Flow subformula Aψi part of ϕ
p ∈ P p [p]i
t ∈ T ∨t′∈{t′∈T> | λ(t′)=t} t′ (∨to∈Oi to)U (∨tm∈Mi(t) tm)
φ φ ((
∨
t∈Oi t)U ((
∨
t∈T>i t) ∧ φ)) ∨ ( (¬(
∨
t∈T>i t)) ∧ φ)
Aψi [ι]iW(¬ [ι]i ∧ ψ′i) –
The size of the constructed formula directly results from the blow-up of the
number of transition during the creation ofN> and the substitutions introducing
the disjunctions over these transition in the creation of ϕ>.
Lemma 2 (Size of the Constructed Formula). The size of the constructed
LTL formula ϕ> is in O(|N|3n · |ϕ|+ |ϕ|).
The proof of the correctness of the transformations for the parallel approach
is very similar to the one of the sequential approach presented in [11]. We again
can mutually transform the counterexample to show the contraposition N 6|=
ϕ iff N> 6|=LTL ϕ>. Here we do not have to pump up the firing sequence serving
as counterexample forN |= ϕ, but have to replace each transition by a transition
which adequately extends all flow chains of the counterexample. For the other
direction, we can replace the transitions of the counterexample by the labels of
the transitions and, analog to the sequential approach, iteratively concatenate
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the transitions and places of the subnets to gain the flow chains serving as
counterexamples for the subformula part. The complicated parts of the structural
induction, i.e., adequately skipping the global timesteps for the flow subformulas,
can be done analogously because the formulas of the parallel approach and the
sequential approach are similar in this case and fit to the different structure of
the net.
B Complete Results
Table 4: We compare the explicit and the logarithmic encoding of the sequential
approach with the parallel approach. The results are the average over 5 runs
from an Intel i7-2700K CPU with 3.50 GHz, 32 GB RAM, and a timeout of
30 minutes. We report the runtimes of IC3 to verify (T) updates of software-
defined networks and the runtimes of both BMC2 and BMC3 to falsify (F)
updates of software-defined networks all with respect to connectivity between
randomly chosen ingress and egress switches and forwarding tables.
expl. enc. log. enc. parallel appr.
T / F Network #Sw Alg. Time |= Alg. Time |= Alg. Time |=
T Arpanet196912 4 IC3 12.0760 3 IC3 9.8872 3 IC3 2.1760 3
T Napnet 6 IC3 146.4920 3 IC3 96.0640 3 IC3 4.7448 3
T Epoch 6 IC3 240.5720 3 IC3 214.6960 3 IC3 6.7800 3
T Telecomserbia 6 IC3 1182.4320 3 IC3 912.7560 3 IC3 12.1232 3
T Layer42 6 IC3 133.1992 3 IC3 131.6824 3 IC3 6.2624 3
T Dataxchange 6 - TO ? IC3 380.1976 3 IC3 19.9968 3
T Sanren 7 IC3 304.6368 3 IC3 437.0128 3 IC3 16.6776 3
T Getnet 7 IC3 940.4160 3 IC3 103.0960 3 IC3 11.0480 3
T Netrail 7 IC3 171.5952 3 IC3 531.5576 3 IC3 31.9800 3
T Heanet 7 IC3 806.8144 3 IC3 84.6160 3 IC3 30.3008 3
T HiberniaIreland 7 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 26.5824 3
T Arpanet19706 9 - TO ? IC3 362.2056 3 IC3 11.3304 3
T Nordu2005 9 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 12.6688 3
T Nsfcnet 10 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 5.5448 3
T Sprint 11 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 745.7408 3
T TLex 12 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 17.1296 3
T Compuserve 13 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 107.9464 3
T Eenet 13 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 40.3456 3
T HiberniaCanada 13 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 107.6000 3
T Navigata 13 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 360.5248 3
T Nsfnet 13 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 181.3240 3
T Uninet 13 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1336.1420 3
T Eunetworks 14 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 80.3952 3
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T Ilan 14 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 137.8408 3
T Claranet 15 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 128.0024 3
T HiberniaUk 15 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 184.5888 3
T Spiralight 15 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 153.2312 3
T Garr199901 16 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 164.5248 3
T KentmanJul2005 16 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 163.2448 3
T Marwan 16 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 136.5992 3
T Peer1 16 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 357.0224 3
T Rhnet 16 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 62.6520 3
T Fatman 17 - TO ? IC3 1543.3360 3 IC3 162.1672 3
T Nextgen 17 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 403.3296 3
T Nordu2010 18 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 50.1136 3
T Pacificwave 18 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 932.5960 3
T Ans 18 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1511.3020 3
T Arpanet19719 18 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 840.6400 3
T BsonetEurope 18 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 496.2936 3
T HiberniaNireland 18 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 229.0768 3
T Noel 19 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 402.8256 3
T Restena 19 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 698.4024 3
T Savvis 19 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1382.3480 3
T Twaren 20 - TO ? IC3 1167.9080 3 IC3 1388.6660 3
T Janetlense 20 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 730.6448 3
T BtAsiaPac 20 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1311.1100 3
T Oxford 20 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 678.3344 3
T Harnet 21 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 347.0536 3
T Belnet2009 21 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1604.5860 3
T GtsRomania 21 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 236.7912 3
T Packetexchange 21 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 688.5176 3
T Garr200404 22 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 184.8440 3
T Belnet2010 22 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 346.6064 3
T Garr200109 22 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1499.7620 3
T KentmanApr2007 22 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 429.7848 3
T Istar 23 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 169.0848 3
T Garr199905 23 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 440.1864 3
T Garr199904 23 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 590.0240 3
T Cesnet2001 23 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 308.9808 3
T Fccn 23 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 752.9816 3
T Uran 24 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 82.6056 3
T Garr200112 24 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1731.2440 3
T Psinet 24 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 226.0680 3
T Arpanet19723 25 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 218.3872 3
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T Vinaren 25 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1084.5340 3
T KentmanFeb2008 26 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 421.7424 3
T Garr200212 27 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1205.4020 3
T Bbnplanet 27 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 896.9776 3
T Darkstrand 27 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1466.4960 3
T KentmanAug2005 28 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 278.9248 3
T Myren 37 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1309.2280 3
T KentmanJan2011 38 - TO ? - TO ? IC3 1261.3220 3
F Arpanet196912 4 BMC2 2.3528 7 BMC2 2.0952 7 BMC2 1.1992 7
F Arpanet196912 4 BMC3 2.1768 7 BMC3 1.8528 7 BMC3 1.1968 7
F Napnet 6 BMC2 4.1688 7 BMC2 5.2240 7 BMC2 1.6408 7
F Napnet 6 BMC3 5.7072 7 BMC3 5.4368 7 BMC3 1.4808 7
F Epoch 6 BMC2 20.7584 7 BMC2 14.3200 7 BMC2 2.6328 7
F Epoch 6 BMC3 15.4112 7 BMC3 13.5632 7 BMC3 2.3912 7
F Telecomserbia 6 BMC2 45.1120 7 BMC2 39.7160 7 BMC2 13.2600 7
F Telecomserbia 6 BMC3 37.5104 7 BMC3 41.4688 7 BMC3 12.8704 7
F Layer42 6 BMC2 9.4880 7 BMC2 11.8768 7 BMC2 2.0744 7
F Layer42 6 BMC3 11.4400 7 BMC3 6.7544 7 BMC3 2.5560 7
F Sanren 7 BMC2 64.8976 7 BMC2 134.8184 7 BMC2 8.2312 7
F Sanren 7 BMC3 173.9256 7 BMC3 81.2960 7 BMC3 3.8832 7
F Getnet 7 BMC2 7.3792 7 BMC2 9.2480 7 BMC2 1.6872 7
F Getnet 7 BMC3 7.5144 7 BMC3 7.2872 7 BMC3 1.5248 7
F Netrail 7 BMC2 80.8968 7 BMC2 50.0872 7 BMC2 5.6976 7
F Netrail 7 BMC3 63.8416 7 BMC3 72.6552 7 BMC3 3.5632 7
F Heanet 7 BMC2 57.2528 7 BMC2 66.6016 7 BMC2 5.6632 7
F Heanet 7 BMC3 54.5128 7 BMC3 27.9272 7 BMC3 5.5848 7
F Arpanet19706 9 BMC2 52.5888 7 BMC2 44.3200 7 BMC2 7.7576 7
F Arpanet19706 9 BMC3 58.1392 7 BMC3 33.6264 7 BMC3 4.5640 7
F Nordu2005 9 BMC2 35.9496 7 BMC2 33.2320 7 BMC2 6.0872 7
F Nordu2005 9 BMC3 38.6664 7 BMC3 25.6184 7 BMC3 3.2904 7
F Nsfcnet 10 BMC2 14.3520 7 BMC2 13.2688 7 BMC2 2.1520 7
F Nsfcnet 10 BMC3 13.5312 7 BMC3 4.8568 7 BMC3 2.0184 7
F Sprint 11 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 567.1048 7
F Sprint 11 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 582.5752 7
F TLex 12 BMC2 92.9472 7 BMC2 81.4936 7 BMC2 4.9240 7
F TLex 12 BMC3 89.6536 7 BMC3 49.1896 7 BMC3 7.0464 7
F Compuserve 13 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 544.4312 7
F Compuserve 13 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 460.1632 7
F Eenet 13 BMC2 249.1056 7 BMC2 238.0224 7 BMC2 21.8432 7
F Eenet 13 BMC3 271.4032 7 BMC3 218.4312 7 BMC3 19.5312 7
F HiberniaCanada 13 BMC2 1309.4440 7 BMC2 935.0480 7 BMC2 149.3392 7
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F HiberniaCanada 13 BMC3 1304.8740 7 BMC3 1097.0560 7 BMC3 53.5256 7
F Navigata 13 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 440.9632 7
F Navigata 13 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 319.2552 7
F Nsfnet 13 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 159.0920 7
F Nsfnet 13 - TO ? BMC3 1621.8300 7 BMC3 177.6008 7
F Eunetworks 14 BMC2 1039.4640 7 BMC2 1104.7060 7 BMC2 38.2784 7
F Eunetworks 14 BMC3 1417.8800 7 BMC3 1056.0080 7 BMC3 35.9568 7
F Claranet 15 BMC2 189.4912 7 BMC2 165.1504 7 BMC2 10.2744 7
F Claranet 15 BMC3 160.3808 7 BMC3 150.6000 7 BMC3 7.9720 7
F Spiralight 15 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1249.4900 7
F Spiralight 15 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1734.8840 7
F Garr199901 16 BMC2 625.8648 7 BMC2 432.1856 7 BMC2 31.3360 7
F Garr199901 16 BMC3 743.3096 7 BMC3 370.4792 7 BMC3 61.6488 7
F KentmanJul2005 16 BMC2 1391.2280 7 BMC2 1243.6260 7 BMC2 175.4600 7
F KentmanJul2005 16 BMC3 1405.8180 7 BMC3 1030.0400 7 BMC3 171.0152 7
F Marwan 16 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 696.8736 7
F Marwan 16 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 799.7816 7
F Peer1 16 - TO ? - TO ? - TO ?
F Peer1 16 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1551.8120 7
F Rhnet 16 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 105.4688 7
F Rhnet 16 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 49.9360 7
F Fatman 17 BMC2 193.7456 7 BMC2 200.3976 7 BMC2 18.1704 7
F Fatman 17 BMC3 168.7768 7 BMC3 169.8224 7 BMC3 6.7232 7
F Goodnet 17 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 410.3936 7
F Goodnet 17 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 378.1480 7
F Nextgen 17 - TO ? - TO ? - TO ?
F Nextgen 17 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 5014.4240 7
F Nordu2010 18 BMC2 183.4608 7 BMC2 140.1384 7 BMC2 13.6824 7
F Nordu2010 18 BMC3 116.1192 7 BMC3 80.7856 7 BMC3 6.9120 7
F Pacificwave 18 BMC2 1761.4720 7 BMC2 1035.8420 7 BMC2 95.0104 7
F Pacificwave 18 BMC3 1166.0460 7 BMC3 1545.4200 7 BMC3 64.5768 7
F BsonetEurope 18 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 770.6568 7
F BsonetEurope 18 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1195.4540 7
F Highwinds 18 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 671.2392 7
F Highwinds 18 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1045.0800 7
F Noel 19 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1356.7820 7
F Noel 19 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 611.0792 7
F Restena 19 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 630.9496 7
F Restena 19 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 192.2696 7
F Twaren 20 BMC2 560.8456 7 BMC2 429.7516 7 BMC2 66.7208 7
F Twaren 20 BMC3 650.5672 7 BMC3 349.0816 7 BMC3 31.4976 7
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F Marnet 20 BMC2 858.9728 7 BMC2 557.1536 7 BMC2 18.9960 7
F Marnet 20 BMC3 846.0584 7 BMC3 475.7168 7 BMC3 26.4488 7
F Janetlense 20 BMC2 735.1432 7 BMC2 721.8584 7 BMC2 28.1296 7
F Janetlense 20 BMC3 492.5848 7 BMC3 616.7248 7 BMC3 28.6504 7
F BtAsiaPac 20 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1298.5280 7
F BtAsiaPac 20 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 897.9200 7
F Oxford 20 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 645.1712 7
F Oxford 20 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 521.4232 7
F Harnet 21 BMC2 961.5872 7 BMC2 873.2056 7 BMC2 60.4784 7
F Harnet 21 BMC3 1410.2540 7 BMC3 735.7256 7 BMC3 58.4040 7
F Belnet2009 21 BMC2 1146.2600 7 BMC2 611.8096 7 BMC2 43.8104 7
F Belnet2009 21 - TO ? BMC3 1294.5020 7 BMC3 24.2568 7
F Garr200404 22 BMC2 61.5632 7 BMC2 70.9440 7 BMC2 6.1848 7
F Garr200404 22 BMC3 45.9016 7 BMC3 49.3768 7 BMC3 4.6952 7
F Bandcon 22 - TO ? - TO ? - TO ?
F Bandcon 22 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1619.6780 7
F KentmanApr2007 22 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 914.6352 7
F KentmanApr2007 22 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 414.7120 7
F Istar 23 BMC2 574.5056 7 BMC2 302.8448 7 BMC2 29.0296 7
F Istar 23 BMC3 221.1632 7 BMC3 236.4752 7 BMC3 22.8224 7
F Garr199905 23 BMC2 188.2176 7 BMC2 155.1984 7 BMC2 13.4320 7
F Garr199905 23 BMC3 272.3944 7 BMC3 78.0928 7 BMC3 10.9904 7
F Garr199904 23 BMC2 478.9360 7 BMC2 342.0088 7 BMC2 65.7056 7
F Garr199904 23 BMC3 304.7032 7 BMC3 385.6456 7 BMC3 33.4232 7
F Aconet 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 366.4816 7
F Aconet 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 642.5488 7
F Belnet2003 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 135.0384 7
F Belnet2003 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 126.2848 7
F Belnet2005 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 795.6688 7
F Belnet2005 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 558.2600 7
F Cesnet2001 23 - TO ? BMC2 1439.4880 7 BMC2 277.3880 7
F Cesnet2001 23 - TO ? BMC3 1508.9240 7 BMC3 169.1864 7
F Fccn 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 772.9776 7
F Fccn 23 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 785.8392 7
F Uran 24 BMC2 87.9600 7 BMC2 126.0488 7 BMC2 4.0680 7
F Uran 24 BMC3 71.7760 7 BMC3 72.4816 7 BMC3 3.8056 7
F BtEurope 24 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 5035.2740 7
F BtEurope 24 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 5030.4000 7
F Garr200112 24 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 538.3072 7
F Garr200112 24 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 294.9824 7
F Arpanet19723 25 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1774.0800 7
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F Arpanet19723 25 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1079.5160 7
F Vinaren 25 BMC2 1537.2920 7 BMC2 799.1280 7 BMC2 138.3432 7
F Vinaren 25 BMC3 1093.3200 7 BMC3 1171.3140 7 BMC3 93.6536 7
F KentmanFeb2008 26 BMC2 152.6880 7 BMC2 230.8040 7 BMC2 7.1976 7
F KentmanFeb2008 26 BMC3 83.3048 7 BMC3 89.7208 7 BMC3 4.4288 7
F Garr200212 27 BMC2 416.9272 7 BMC2 405.2304 7 BMC2 29.7792 7
F Garr200212 27 BMC3 418.8768 7 BMC3 301.6184 7 BMC3 14.4280 7
F Gambia 28 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 916.3864 7
F Gambia 28 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 586.2224 7
F KentmanAug2005 28 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 799.1960 7
F KentmanAug2005 28 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 935.1016 7
F Ernet 30 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 462.7160 7
F Ernet 30 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 361.0344 7
F WideJpn 30 - TO ? - TO ? - TO ?
F WideJpn 30 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 336.8296 7
F Iinet 31 BMC2 1380.3760 7 BMC2 1217.9420 7 BMC2 76.8728 7
F Iinet 31 BMC3 1468.8020 7 BMC3 701.2528 7 BMC3 97.9888 7
F CrlNetworkServices 33 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1534.4540 7
F CrlNetworkServices 33 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 591.3928 7
F GtsSlovakia 35 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 938.1456 7
F GtsSlovakia 35 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1014.7040 7
F Bren 37 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 346.8384 7
F Bren 37 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 799.3200 7
F Myren 37 BMC2 183.0128 7 BMC2 154.1552 7 BMC2 10.1816 7
F Myren 37 BMC3 142.0280 7 BMC3 75.9296 7 BMC3 12.9468 7
F KentmanJan2011 38 BMC2 237.3152 7 BMC2 192.5768 7 BMC2 9.3536 7
F KentmanJan2011 38 BMC3 167.9208 7 BMC3 86.4384 7 BMC3 10.5464 7
F Cesnet200511 39 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 496.0712 7
F Cesnet200511 39 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 249.1456 7
F Litnet 43 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 234.4000 7
F Litnet 43 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 223.7856 7
F Bellsouth 51 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 173.6720 7
F Bellsouth 51 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 184.7136 7
F BtLatinAmerica 51 - TO ? - TO ? - TO ?
F BtLatinAmerica 51 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 1346.7440 7
F Garr201103 58 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 164.2792 7
F Garr201103 58 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 89.1304 7
F Forthnet 62 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1040.0800 7
F Forthnet 62 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 752.8008 7
F Latnet 69 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 209.1984 7
F Latnet 69 - TO ? - TO ? BMC3 235.7168 7
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F Ulaknet 82 - TO ? - TO ? BMC2 1043.7440 7
F Ulaknet 82 - TO ? - TO ? - TO ?
